third column reports price per citation. This is the library subscription price divided by the number of times that articles in this journal were cited in 1998, as recorded by the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI). The fourth column, price per recent citation, is the library subscription price divided by the number of times that the 1996 and 1997 volumes of the journal were cited in 1998. The citation rank is found by ranking journals according to the number of times that any volume of this journal was cited in 1998.
Although our focus is on library subscription prices, it is worth noting that most journals offer discounted subscription prices to individuals. The ten most- The differences in prices and cost-effectiveness between nonprofit and commercial journals are similar for less prestigious journals. I have assembled a database that includes essentially all academic English-language economics journals, where the area of economics is interpreted quite broadly. A spreadsheet that contains this list of 297 journals along with page counts, prices, and citation information for each journal can be found on my website at http://econ.ucsb.edu/∼tedb. Table 3 reports costs, pages, and citations for journals owned by nonprofit organizations, by Blackwell Publishing, and by other commercial publishers.
The prices reported are for the year 2000, the pages are calculated for the year 1999, and the total citations from the year 1998. 2 Blackwell has its own row because it occupies a special publishing niche, intermediate between other commercial publishers and the nonprofit publishers. Some Blackwell journals are owned entirely by Blackwell, some are owned jointly by Blackwell and a founding professional society, and some are wholly owned by a founding society which to publish their total number of subscriptions every year. However, almost all commercial journals in economics are mailed from overseas and hence are exempt from this requirement.
2 The SSCI counts citations from articles in only about half of the journals in my database.
The journals from which articles are not counted are typically new or obscure or both. However, the SSCI counts citations to articles in all journals, whether or not citations found in the journal are counted. Tables 1 and 2, commercial publishers charge about six times as much per page and sixteen times as much per citation as nonprofit publishers. Pricing studies by librarians show that the pattern found in economics is common to many disciplines. The commercial journals are far more expensive than the journals published by the professional societies, but the most-cited and influential journals are almost universally those published at low cost by professional societies. About 50 percent of all citations in chemistry come from journals published by professional societies, but expenditure on these journals constitutes only about 25 percent of library subscription costs for chemistry journals (Wilder 1998) . Similar price discrepancies have been reported from journal price studies in agriculture, mathematics, physics, and medicine.
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Journal Costs and Profits
Given that nonprofit and commercial journals use essentially the same technology for journal publication, the large difference in prices is not likely to be explained by differences in costs. Although most commercial publishers are unwilling to reveal information about either their costs or their numbers of subscriptions, we can use information made available by nonprofit journals to estimate the costs and subscriptions of the commercial journals. Tenopir and
King (Tenopir and King 2000) survey several cost studies for academic journals.
The costs of publishing a journal can be usefully partitioned into first copy costs and marginal subscriber costs. First copy costs are those that are required to produce even a single issue and are independent of the number of subscribers. For an academic journal, first copy costs include the cost of managing an editorial office-primarily wages and secretarial support for editors who handle, evaluate, and comment on the papers that authors submit-and the costs of copy-editing and typesetting. Marginal subscriber costs include the cost of printing and paper, shipping and postage, and the costs of managing subscriptions.
First copy costs are roughly proportional to the number of pages published 4 Case (Case 1999) to do so because these journals were founded at a time when the economics profession was growing rapidly and while at the same time, the existing nonprofit journals failed to expand their size and scope to accommodate the great increase in work of publishable quality. In their early years, the leading commercial journals were priced much more competitively than they are today. As their reputations grew, their publishers took advantage of their newly-acquired prestige by raising prices far more rapidly than did the nonprofit journals. Tables 5 and 6 
How Can This Happen?
There is free entry to the journal-publishing industry. Libraries are not compelled to subscribe to expensive journals and scholars are not compelled to write for them, referee for them, or edit for them. Why has competition not driven profits to zero?
To understand how a few commercial publishers have been able to extract huge profits from the academic community, despite the possibility of new entrants into the industry and despite competition from nonprofit journals, it is useful to consider game theory's notion of a coordination game. In a coordination game, each player chooses an action from among several alternatives and each player's payoff increases with the number of other players whose choice is the same as her own. An equilibrium is an outcome such that given the actions of others, no player could individually benefit by switching to another action. Coordination games commonly have many different equilibria, in each of which all players choose the same action. An outcome can be an equilibrium even though there is another equilibrium that would be better for everyone and which could be reached if all players were to change simultaneously to the same new action.
The Anarchists' Annual Meeting: A Parable
This tale is intended to illustrate the workings of coordination games, and to
show that in such games, the presence of potential competitors does not necessarily prevent monopoly pricing.
A large number of anarchists find it valuable to attend an annual meeting of like-minded people. The meeting is more valuable to each of them, the greater the number of other anarchists who attend. A meeting attended by only a few is of little value to any of them. At some time in the past, the anarchists started to gather on a particular day of the year in one hotel in a certain city. Other hotels in this and other cities would have served equally well for the meeting, but since each anarchist expects the others to appear at the usual hotel, they return every year to the same hotel on the day of the meeting.
A few years after the anarchists had established their routine, the hotel that served as their meeting-place increased its prices for the day of their annual meeting. Most anarchists valued the annual meeting so highly that they continued to attend, despite the price increase. A few decided that at the higher price, they would rather stay home. The hotel owner observed that although attendance was slightly reduced, the fall in attendance was less than the proportional to the price increase and thus his revenue and his profits increased. In subsequent years, after some experimentation, the hotel owner learned that he could maximize his annual profit by setting a price on the anarchists' meeting day that was much higher than that of other hotels. After setting this price, the hotel owner proclaimed that he was offering a uniquely valuable service to the anarchists.
The anarchists were annoyed at having to pay tribute to the hotel owner for services no better than other hotels offered more cheaply. Moreover, since all of the anarchists prefer larger attendance to smaller, they were all made worse off by the fact that high prices caused some of their number to stay home. But what else could they do? Each anarchist was aware that he or she would be better off if they could all meet at one of the many other hotels offering equal physical facilities at a lower price. Given their beliefs and temperaments, the anarchists were resistant to making and obeying centralized decisions. Lacking central direction, the anarchists were unable to coordinate a move to another hotel. No individual, nor even any small group of anarchists, could gain by moving to another hotel because small meetings, however cheap, are not worth much to any of them.
Pessimistic anarchists speculated that even if they were somehow able to recoordinate at a cheaper hotel, this victory would be shortlived. The new hotel like its predecessor would raise its prices to take advantage of the anarchists' disorderly ways. More optimistic anarchists suggested that the problem of organizing a meeting at a new hotel is not insurmountable, even for anarchists.
Therefore, argued the optimists, once it is demonstrated that the anarchists will move their meeting if prices become excessive, the hotel at which they settle will moderate its prices rather than provoke another mass defection.
Like Unto ...
Like the Anarchists' Annual Meeting, academic publishing can be understood as a coordination game, where scholars in their roles as authors, referees, editors, and readers coordinate at journals. Journals that regularly attract the most able authors, editors, and referees gain prestige and are more frequently read and cited than less prestigious journals. The most able authors prefer to publish their papers in prestigious journals where their work is more likely to be read.
At any given price, more libraries will subscribe to a journal, the more frequently it is read and cited, and conversely, more scholars will read from and write for a journal the more widely it is available in libraries.
There is nothing intrinsically valuable in the title of a prestigious commercial journal, nor are the services rendered by its publisher of higher quality than those offered much more cheaply by nonprofit publishers. Much as the hotel owner in the parable found it profitable to raise his prices above prices charged by other hotels, the commercial publishers of successful academic journals have discovered that they can set their prices far above their average costs. These high prices reduce their number of subscribers, but increase their profits, since the proportionate effect on quantity is less than the proportionate price increase. The profits collected by commercial journals are not payments for any input that the publisher provides, but are simply rents that they can collect because of their position as a focal point in a game of coordination.
Just as the anarchists were annoyed by the high prices at their hotel, many scholars and librarians are distressed at the way that overpriced journals drain university budgets and by the fact that since small libraries are excluded by high prices, access to scholarly work in journals is artificially restricted. It remains to be seen whether, like the anarchists, the academic commuity is stuck in an equilibrium where it will continue to pay huge rents to owners of commercial journals.
What Can We Do?
Before the 1970's, almost all significant economics research was published in nonprofit journals that maintained reasonable pricing policies. Even today, the economics profession remains tantalizingly close to a satisfactory equilibrium in which almost all significant work is published in reasonably-priced journals.
The most prestigious journals in economics are also among the cheapest (Tables   1 and 2) . Moreover, about 60 percent of all citations recorded by the SSCI are found in nonprofit journals whose cost is less than 10 percent of the cost of the library subscriptions to all economics journals (Table 4) . But the academic community is paying dearly for the fact that coordination is imperfect, since about 80 percent of the cost of a complete economics collection is spent on expensive journals that supply only 30 percent of all citations.
Let us consider some strategies that show promise of nudging our publishing activities into a new equilibrium that will better serve the academic community.
Expanding Nonprofit Journals
The most straightforward way to coordinate libraries, authors, editors, referees, and readers around reasonably priced journals would be to expand the elite journals currently published by the professional societies and university presses.
As shown in Table 5 , in the last fifteen years, only three of the top ten nonprofit journals have significantly increased their annual number of pages. During the same time period, nine of the ten top commercial journals substantially increased their page count and the average number of pages in these journals more than doubled.
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Can it be that expanding the top nonprofit journals would unduly lower their standards of quality? I don't think so. During the past 20 years, the number of economics journals published has more than doubled and the number of articles per journal in the top commercial journals has also doubled. The top nonprofit journals remain the preferred outlets for most economists. Roughly speaking, the elite commercial journals lie in a second echelon, just below the leading nonprofits. Expanding the size of the top nonprofit journals would attract strong articles away from the overpriced journals.
The most successful commercial journals commercial journals are devoted to specific subfields of economics. Probably the main reason that these journals have succeeded is that the established elite journals tend to prefer articles of general interest and to reject more specialized articles, even though they may be of great interest to a relatively small group of readers. Hal Varian has an interesting suggestion for expanding the number of articles published by the AEA. This suggestion is modelled on procedures of the American Medical
Association. If a paper is submitted to the Journal of the American Medical
Association and the paper is rejected as being "too specialized," the paper and the associated reviews can, at the discretion of the author, be routed to the appropriate AMA specialized journal. The editor of the specialized journal can accept the paper on the basis of the original reviews, or seek additional reviews.
In addition to offering a home for high quality applied work, this proposal has the advantage that a group of journals with separate editorial boards would allow for plurality and diversity of tastes, while the endorsement (and financial backing) of a major professional society would confer the prestige needed to coordinate scholars under a new banner.
Supporting New Electronic Journals
Within the last few months, some innovative and reasonably priced new eco- Individual subscriptions will be available and institutions will be able to buy group subscriptions for all users coming from specific domains. The BEP has pledged that its library subscription price for economics journals will be no more than two-thirds of the average subscription price for economics journals.
Currently they calculate this average price as $458 and accordingly will not charge more than about $300 per year to libraries.
The Electronic Society for Social Scientists (ELSSS) is a nonprofit group
that is soliciting support for publishing a series of electronic publications in direct competition with their Elsevier counterparts. The ELSSS plan is to pay both authors and referees, to let authors own their own copyrights, and to sell subscriptions to libraries at approximately half the price charged by
Elsevier. Detailed information about ELSSS can be found at their website http://www.elsss.org.uk/. Table 7 is my rogues' gallery of the world's most expensive economics journals.
Boycotting Overpriced Journals
All of the journals on this list cost more than $750 per year and more than $0.60 per page. 9 Journals on this list appear to merit a description as "overpriced,"
and I suggest that economists consider at least a partial boycott against them.
Cancelling Subscriptions to Overpriced Journals
Although the leading commercial journals are poor bargains compared to the leading non-profit journals, they publish a great deal of significant research. It would be difficult for a large research library to cancel subscriptions to most of the journals listed in Table 2 . But as Table 7 shows, many high-priced commercial journals have few citations and remarkably high prices per citation. For these journals, there appears to be an easy solution. If your library subscribes to journals with high prices and few citations, why not ask your librarians to cancel these journals and spend the money on something more cost-effective? On my web page at http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/∼tedb, you can find a spreadsheet listing all journals that cost more than $300 and more than $1 per citation.
There is also a list of journals that are relatively good bargains, costing less than $350 and less than $0.50 per citation.
9 I have attempted to make this a complete list of refereed economics journals meeting these criteria. There are many other journals that cost more than $0.60 per page but, because they have fewer pages, cost less than $700 per year. Some of these latter journals are new or highly specialized journals with few subscribers and hence high average costs. 
Editors and Editorial Boards
Editors of expensive journals tell me that they have asked their publishers to restrain their price increases and that these requests fall on deaf ears. Publish- 
What about Authors?
Most authors want to publish in the most prestigious journal that will accept their papers. I don't expect this to change. But in the face of increased price awareness both in the profession and among librarians, I expect the prestige and availability of overpriced journals to diminish. In most areas of economics, many good, reasonably priced journals are available. If you want your article to be available to a wide readership, why not select a journal with a low subscription price and a generous policy for reprints and photocopying? When it comes time to decide where to submit a new paper, one usually has a handful of choices that seem roughly equivalent. I propose that you weigh journals' pricing policies in the balance of your decision.
Free Referees for Overpriced Journals?
I consider it a professional obligation to spend a lot of time writing careful referee reports. For years I paid no attention to the prices that journals charged to libraries when agreeing to referee for them. Now that my eyes have opened, I
see no reason to supply free labor to journals that are gouging university budgets.
In the future, I will refuse to do free refereeing for any of the overpriced journals listed in Table 7 and I suggest that other economists consider doing the same.
Economists at the beginning of their professional careers may find this course of action harder to follow. Refereeing the work of others is a useful learning experience. It can be in one's interest to make a favorable impression on journal editors by writing good referee reports. Perhaps editors will remember your hard work when they consider the paper that you submit to their journal. These are legitimate motives and it would make no sense to ask people to ignore them. On the other hand, economists are professionally trained to be exquisitely attuned to marginal effects and substitution possibilities. Even if you do not make an absolute policy of boycotting expensive journals, you are likely to confront marginal choices where on purely selfish grounds it is a close call whether to spend time refereeing for an expensive journal or on other scholarly activity.
When this happens, I suggest that a regard for professional citizenship should weigh against rather than in favor of assuming this chore.
Conclusion
By charging prices far above their average costs, commercial publishers of academic journals have been draining huge amounts of money from university budgets. Their high prices also prevent the flow of scholarly information to teachers and researchers at universities without large library budgets. Like the anarchists in our Parable of the Anarchists' Annual Meeting, scholars who contribute their efforts to overpriced journals have arrived at an unfortunate equilibrium in a coordination game.
But coordination games have multiple equilibria. The elite commercial journals will retain their prestige and their subscription base only so long as leading scholars continue to coordinate their efforts in these venues; as authors, referees, and editors. The drastic price differences between commercial and nonprofit journals have appeared relatively recently, and most of us have not been paying attention. Publishers of the expensive commercial journals have been unwilling to moderate their prices because they believe that library demand is quite price inelastic once a journal has achieved success. Publishers need to be reminded that the supply of the academic labor that creates a successful journal depends on the good will of the scholarly community. As academics become more aware of the price-gouging strategies of the elite commercial journals, they are likely to become less willing to supply these journals with free labor. Commercial publishers may discover that even if demand for their product is price inelastic, the supply of scholarly effort needed to maintain the quality of their journals is very price responsive.
The economics profession is fortunate that more than 60 percent of our professional research, as measured by citation counts, appears in reasonablypriced journals that are owned by professional societies and university presses.
The introduction of new, reasonably priced electronic journals, an expansion of current nonprofit journals, and the creation of new field journals sponsored by the professional societies will do much to encourage the scholars and libraries to abandon those journals that persist in overpricing. Finally, we should remember that we, ourselves, supply almost all of the work involved in preparing journal articles as unpaid authors, referees, and editors. Journal publishers rely on the good will of the profession to get this work done. Publishers of overpriced journals have lost my good will and my services, at least until they return their prices to reasonable levels. I hope that other economists will take the same view and act on it. 
